Bookmark and Share

The Defense Intelligence Agency serves as the Pentagon’s top spy agency responsible for providing data on foreign militaries. DIA intelligence has been used extensively by military and civilian planners during crises, and in some cases, the agency has been implicated in recent scandals related to the Bush administration’s war on terrorism.


Before the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1961, the responsibility for gathering military intelligence fell to the armed services. Intelligence officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force collected, produced and disseminated intelligence for each of their branches of service. Sharing information was not commonplace. This system resulted in duplicated efforts and proved to be both costly and ineffective, as each service provided intelligence to the Secretary of Defense, various military commands or other governmental agencies.
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 tried to correct this flawed system by establishing a unit under the Joint Chiefs of Staff called J-2, which was assigned responsibility for providing intelligence support to military commands. But J-2 alone didn’t resolve the problem of coordination between the services as well as the lack of a national focus in military intelligence gathering efforts. President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed a Joint Study Group in 1960 to determine better ways of effectively organizing the nation’s military intelligence activities.
Acting on the recommendations of the Joint Study Group, President John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, decided to establish the Defense Intelligence Agency, tasked with developing a plan that would integrate the military intelligence efforts of all the armed services. DIA reported to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It collected, processed, evaluated, analyzed, integrated, produced and disseminated military intelligence for the Pentagon. Air Force Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll became DIA’s first director and began operations with a handful of employees in borrowed office space on October 1, 1961.
A year after its formation, DIA faced its first major intelligence test during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. While still organizing itself, the agency assisted the Pentagon as it tried to determine the extent of the military threat that Cuba posed to the United States. In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School and later activated a new production center which was formed from merging several intelligence elements within the Army, Navy and Air Force. (Each branch continued its own intelligence operations, however.) DIA also added an Automated Data Processing (ADP) Center, a Dissemination Center and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate. DIA assumed the staff-support functions of the J-2 and eventually accepted responsibility for the Defense Attache System from the armed services.
During the 1960s, DIA ran into opposition from the Army, Navy and Air Force, as the agency tried to assert its authority over Pentagon intelligence gathering operations. At the same time, the Vietnam War severely tested the fledgling agency’s ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence, including gathering information on American military personnel who were either missing-in-action (MIA) or became prisoners of war (POW). The decade saw DIA analysts focus on: China's detonation of an atomic bomb and the launching of its cultural revolution; fighting in Malaysia, Cyprus and Kashmir; the Tet offensive in Vietnam; the Six-Day War between Egypt and Israel; unrest in several African countries, particularly Nigeria; the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; and North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo, a Navy spy ship.
The early 1970’s were transitional years for DIA, as the agency shifted its focus from consolidating management roles to being a producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first because of military downsizing that occurred as the US gradually pulled out of Vietnam, causing DIA’s budget to shrink. DIA nonetheless conducted intelligence gathering on a variety of international developments, including the rise of Ostpolitik in Germany; the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Middle East; growing arms control concerns; riots in Gdansk, Poland; civil wars in Jordan and Nigeria; the US invasion of Cambodia from South Vietnam; Idi Amin’s takeover in Uganda; and unrest in Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh.
In November 1970, the Pentagon created a new position, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I), charged with supervising DIA programs and working with the Director of Central Intelligence and other intelligence officials outside of DoD. Also in November, President Richard Nixon reorganized the national Intelligence Community (IC) and designated DIA’s director as program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP). The agency also established a Directorate for Estimates that same month.
The year 1972 saw DIA analysts focusing on problems in Lebanon; President Nixon’s visit to China; the formation of Sri Lanka; President Salvador Allende’s rise in Chile; POWs being held in Southeast Asia; détente between the US and the Soviet Union and the development of arms control agreements between the superpowers; the Paris peace talks (Vietnam); the Yom Kippur War; global energy concerns; coups in Ethiopia and Portugal; and independence movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.
In 1974 DIA established a J-2 Support Office to better satisfy the intelligence needs of the Joint Chiefs and conducted a comprehensive overhaul of its production functions, organization and management. Positions for Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs) were also established, responsible for acting as the DIA director’s senior staff representatives on key intelligence matters.
During 1975-76 Congress conducted investigations into illegal spying by military intelligence officers during the Vietnam War. It was revealed that the Army had spied on war protesters and Army personnel who refused to fight in the war. The Rockefeller Commission discovered Army intelligence had compiled dossiers on between 2,000 and 5,000 individuals and numerous political organizations, including the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties Union. Although DIA was not implicated in the scandal, the agency was affected by the turbulence surrounding the entire Intelligence Community. Legislation was passed to clamp down on any future domestic spying operations by federal intelligence offices. Within DIA, a report from the Intelligence Management Study Group led to a reorganization of all DIA production activities.
Between the spying scandal and the final withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam in 1975, DIA and other intelligence gathering operations found themselves on the budget chopping block. This forced DIA to conduct numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products with fewer resources. The agency modernized the National Military Intelligence Center and centralized its activities. The ASD/I was designated Director of Defense Intelligence, a Defense Intelligence Board was established and the President set up a National Foreign Intelligence Board.
The fallout from the domestic spying didn’t settle until 1979 when President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence Community. For DIA it meant reorganizing itself around five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs and J-2 support. The late 1970s also brought about several key failures by intelligence gathering operations. DIA and other spy offices did not forewarn American officials about the danger inside Iran, where a mass revolt toppled longtime dictator Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, or the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. DIA blamed these failures on budget cutbacks that hampered intelligence operations throughout the Intelligence Community.
DIA characterized the 1980s as a time when the agency “came of age” by focusing heavily on the intelligence needs of both field commanders and top officials in the federal government. DIA began providing intelligence support to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force during Operation Bright Star, an annual military exercise involving American and Egyptian military forces in Egypt. The agency also gained a valuable friend in President Ronald Reagan, who made defense spending a top priority in his administration. In fact, the Reagan administration’s massive arms buildup was predicated, in part, on information compiled by DIA about the status of the Soviet Union’s strategic and conventional military forces. In 1981, the agency published the first in a series of white papers on the strengths and capabilities of Soviet military forces titled, “Soviet Military Power.” Ten such booklets were published over the next 10 years to much acclaim…according to DIA.  
However, not everyone was convinced by DIA’s assessment of Soviet military might. Former high-ranking military officers working for the non-profit Center for Defense Information questioned DIA’s analysis, arguing the white papers exaggerated the capabilities of the Soviet Union. The DIA white papers were also refuted by Tom Gervasi, a former counterintelligence officer who published numerous articles and books on US military and spying operations, including The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy. Critics contended that the warnings by administration officials over Soviet military threats were overblown to justify an unprecedented rise in DoD budgets.
With increases in Pentagon spending came expanded opportunities for DIA. In 1981, the agency broke ground on the new Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC. DIA pitched the importance of its services to the military and DoD as a “force multiplier in crises,” arguing that its intelligence gathering could prove a huge advantage for American decision-makers during emergencies. The agency established a Research Crisis Support Center at the DIAC to provide a centralized, operationally secure, all-source, crisis management center to support top military and civilian leaders.
International crises were in no short supply during the eighties. DIA analysts provided support to US Southern Command as US officials kept watch on the Sandinista government in Nicaragua (DIA was not implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal) and the war over the Falkland Islands between Great Britain and Argentina. DIA also closely followed Israel’s invasion of Lebanon - although it failed to warn US military officials about a planned attack on the US Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 that killed 241 American personnel. Other key events DIA kept watch over included the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan resistance to Soviet military occupation, the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the civil war in Chad and unrest in the Philippines.
Indeed, 1985 alone was filled with key hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, murders and other acts of terrorism, leading some to call it the “Year of the Terrorist.” Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger presented DIA with the agency's first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support during a series of crises, including the hijackings of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship Achille Lauro, fighting in the Philippines that threatened the regime of Ferdinand Marcos and counterterrorist operations against Libya.
Also at this time, the agency concentrated on the rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as changes within the Soviet Union from Mikhail Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika policies and counter-narcotics operations being conducted in support of the war on drugs. DoD moved to improve its automated data bases and apply additional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also increased the demand for intelligence support from DIA, thanks to the signing of the INF Treaty and the START talks. Within DIA, the National Military Intelligence Center was upgraded and renovated so it could connect with the National Military Command Center, allowing the two key centers to combine operations and intelligence during crises. Designated a “combat support agency” under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, DIA moved quickly to increase cooperation with military commands and to begin developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine.
Intelligence support to US allies in the Middle East intensified as the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Persian Gulf. DIA provided intelligence support to Operation Earnest Will, the escorting of oil tankers by the US Navy, while monitoring incidents such as the Iraqi rocket attack on the USS Stark, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The “Toyota War” (so named because of the preponderance of Toyota pickups) between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA’s heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan and the Philippines.
In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour, crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled to push Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation Desert Storm began, some 2,000 agency personnel were involved in support of Allied operations, with more than 100 employees sent into the Kuwaiti Theater of operations to provide intelligence support as part 11 National Military Support Teams. DIA proudly pointed to its contributions during Desert Storm as the high-point in the agency’s history to date. The agency said assessments conducted after the war showed field commanders benefited greatly from the information provided by DIA, which earned a second DoD Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its work. This commendation was awarded despite complaints by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of Allied military operations, that criticized the quality and timeliness of intelligence given his forces during the Persian Gulf War.
With the end of the Cold War, DIA had to reevaluate its priorities and organization. DoD leaders decided to move the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) to DIA after being part of the US Army. DIA also undertook one of the most profound reorganizations in its history in 1993. This restructuring essentially rebuilt the agency from the bottom up, bringing about a new level of integration among DIA, the military services and the combatant commands. This integration helped provide intelligence support to US and United Nations forces involved in crises in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Haiti. In 1994, DIA received a third Joint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support during these crises.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in the deaths of seven DIA employees when American Airlines flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. With the launching of the Global War on Terrorism by the administration of George W. Bush, DIA’s role only grew in significance. Intelligence provided by DIA was used by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 - intelligence that subsequently was criticized for lacking actual data about Iraq’s link to al Qaeda. The agency also has found itself swept up in controversies that arose as a result of the Bush administration’s no-holds-barred attitude in going after suspected terrorists, including the Abu Ghraib scandal (see Controversies).
Gulf Intelligence Draws Complaint by Schwarzkopf (by Michael Wines, New York Times)

DIA: 35 Years, A Brief History



What it Does  

A key component of the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency serves as the Pentagon’s top spy agency responsible for providing data on foreign militaries. As discussed in its strategic plan (PDF), DIA provides information for a range of stakeholders, from military field commanders to intelligence experts outside of DoD to officials in the White House, including the President. The kind of intelligence that the agency produces can include details on foreign military and paramilitary forces, their capabilities and intentions; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; threats of international terrorism; international narcotics trafficking; and defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic and medical and health information.
DIA Centers: DIA is headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, with major operational activities at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) in Washington, DC, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) in Frederick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) in Huntsville, Alabama.
AFMIC is the sole DoD producer of medical intelligence. The center provides intelligence on foreign infectious diseases and environmental health risks, foreign military and civilian health care systems, as well as “infrastructures and foreign biomedical development and life science technologies of military medical significance” (read: biological warfare). The Missile and Space Intelligence Center keeps watch on foreign missile systems, both surface-to-air and ballistic missiles with ranges less than 1000 km. MSIC determines characteristics, capabilities and limitations of foreign military systems, including data about related weapons, weapon system material, research, development, test, evaluation and production.
Intelligence Gathering Systems: DIA performs its work using essentially two kinds of intelligence gathering methods - humans and machines. A major component of the agency is the Defense HUMINT Service, a global network of “intelligence operatives” (i.e. spies) who collect information that is not attainable through technical means.
DIA also employs several technology-related systems for spying on foreign countries’ military means. These are Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT),
 Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), all of which utilize data that has been ascertained from spy satellites and other high-tech instrumentation operated by the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Other DIA Operations: To support DoD’s role in the global war on terrorism, DIA established the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT), which consolidates terrorism-related intelligence from DIA sources and other members of the Intelligence Community.
The National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), a principal component of DIA, is a fully accredited educational institution authorized by Congress to award a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and a Bachelor of Science degree in intelligence. With a student body of more than 700, NDIC has students from federal agencies and all branches of the US Armed Services. All students must be employed in the federal government and hold Top Secret security clearances.
DIA also manages the Defense Attaché System, which has military attachés assigned to more than 135 embassies overseas. Defense attachés perform duties ranging from information gathering to diplomacy.
DIA also works with the Intelligence Community’s Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Analytic Cell. This unit helps to locate missing, isolated, evading or captured US military and government personnel.

Rebranding the DIA



Where Does the Money Go  

The Defense Intelligence Agency conducts its contracting business through the Virginia Contracting Activity, also known as VACA. Through VACA, DIA acquires products and services required to support its combat support mission. According to, VACA distributed almost $3.5 billion in contracts to 998 companies from 2000-2007. Spending on ADP (automatic data processing) and telecommunications services represented the largest expenditure, almost $1 billion.
Of the $3.5 billion allocated by VACA, approximately half of it went to DIA’s top 10 contractors:
BAE Systems
Northrop Grumman
Booz Allen Hamilton 
Computer Sciences Corp.
Science Applications International Corp.
L-3 Communications Holdings 
McDonald Bradley Inc. 
Mantech International Corp. 
Sparta, Inc. 
The $3.5 billion does not include a new initiative launched by DIA in 2007 to
pay private contractors up to $1 billion to conduct core intelligence tasks of analysis and collection over the next five years. If DIA follows through with its plans, the amount would set a record in the outsourcing of such functions by the agency. The announcement came only a few months after CIA Director Michael V. Hayden caved under pressure from Congress to cut his agency’s hiring of outside contractors by at least 10%.
A story in Military Information Technology magazine described the DIA “as one of the largest collectors of information on the planet” and “responsible for amassing and analyzing all sources of human intelligence in the field from all information types in a multitude of languages.” Thus, the agency is in need of lots of computer systems and advanced databases. According to the Federation of American Scientists, contractors who have provided Information Technology (IT) for DoD’s Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) include:
·        Sun Microsystems
·        BTG, Inc.
·        Sysorex Information System Inc.
·        Digital Equipment Corporation
·        Cordant, Inc.
·        Dunn Computer Corporation
·        Dynamic Decisions, Inc.
·        Sylvest Management Systems
·        Sytel, Inc
·        NAI Technologies, Systems Division
·        Candes Systems, Inc.
·        Wang Federal, Inc.

New technology is helping defense intelligence analysts sort through huge volumes of data

(by Cheryl Gerber, Military Information Technology)



Pentagon Shutting Down CIFA
In April 2008 senior Pentagon officials said DoD was planning to shut down the controversial Counterintelligence Field Activity office. The move was part of a broad effort under Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to review, overhaul and, in some cases, dismantle an intelligence architecture built by his predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld.
CIFA was created by Rumsfeld after 9/11 as part of an effort to counter the operations of foreign intelligence services and terror groups inside the United States and abroad. But the office, whose size and budget was classified, came under fierce criticism in 2005 after it was disclosed that it was managing a database that included information about antiwar protests planned at churches, schools and Quaker meeting halls.
The Pentagon’s senior intelligence official, James R. Clapper, recommended to Gates that CIFA be dismantled and that some of its operations be placed under the authority of DIA.
Pentagon Is Expected to Close Intelligence Unit (by Mark Mazzetti, New York Times)
DIA Seeks Relaxation of Domestic Law
In 2005 DIA tried to get Congress to loosen restrictions established in the 1970s on domestic intelligence operations. The agency insisted all it wanted was the ability for its agents to go undercover when they approach Americans who may have useful national-security information, rather than identifying themselves as intelligence operatives.
The provision, inserted in a wide-ranging intelligence bill, would have given the DIA officials latitude to meet US citizens without pulling out their DIA badges and later sending a formal notice of their rights under the landmark 1974 Privacy Act. The act was passed in the wake of the intelligence scandals of the 1960s and 1970s, and civil liberties advocates raised concerns that the powers the DIA was seeking could be abused.
Agency Seeks Freer Hand To Recruit Spies in U.S. (by Douglas Jehl, New York Times)
Abu Ghraib
In April 2004, photographs surfaced that depicted abuse and torture of Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison. Some of the pictures depicted US soldiers, both men and women in military uniforms, laughing and giving thumbs-up signs while posing with naked Iraqi prisoners made to stand, stacked in a pyramid or positioned to perform sex acts.
A criminal investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation Command found numerous instances of “sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses” at Abu Ghraib. The systematic and illegal abuse of detainees was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company and also by members of the American intelligence community. Both current and former DIA officers were reportedly at the prison conducting interrogations, including Steven Anthony Stefanowicz, a former Navy reserve intelligence specialist at the Defense Intelligence Agency who was working as a contractor for CACI International.
DIA countered with a memo, written by the agency’s director to a senior Pentagon official, which claimed two members of his agency witnessed the torture and were threatened and told to keep quiet by other military interrogators. The memorandum said that the DIA officials saw prisoners being brought in to a detention center with burn marks on their backs and complaining about sore kidneys.
In 2005, DIA pushed for legislation that indicated the agency might have something to hide about Abu Ghraib. A provision in the Defense Authorization Bill would have exempted the DIA from having to comply with requests under the Freedom of Information Act. The exception would render records that document “the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations” of the DIA Directorate of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) unreachable to the public. Opponents dubbed the Defense amendment the “Abu Ghraib Protection Act.”
Exposure: The woman behind the camera at Abu Ghraib (by Philip Gourevitch and Errol Morris, New Yorker)
DIA Intelligence Supported Iraq Invasion
When the Bush administration made its case in 2003 for going to war against Iraq, officials crafted their argument around two main points. First, Iraq was compiling weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and second, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had ties to al Qaeda, whom Hussein would gladly supply with WMDs. This latter point was based on an intelligence assessment provided to the White House National Security Council by DIA.
But the assertion of a link between Hussein and al Qaeda proved to be “inappropriate,” according to the Pentagon’s Inspector General, who issued a report in 2007 criticizing DIA’s assessment. The IG’s office reported that DIA’s assessment of the Iraq-al Qaeda link ran contrary to other analyses within the Intelligence Community.
DIA also had supported the White House’s claim of Iraq hiding WMDs. But in June 2003, CNN uncovered a DIA document that said the agency could not find evidence of chemical weapons in Iraq. CNN obtained an unclassified one-page summary of the DIA Operational Support Study, in which the agency said there was “no reliable information” that Iraq was producing new chemical weapons at the time.

Pentagon: WMD report consistent with U.S. case

(by Barbara Starr, Jamie McIntyre and Suzanne Malveaux, CNN)


Suggested Reforms  
Congressional Oversight  

Senate Committee on Armed Services


Former Directors  

Former Directors of DIA


Leave a Comment  
Enter the code:
Table of Contents

Founded: 1961
Annual Budget: Classified ( “guesstimates” DIA’s budget to be approximately $2 billion)
Employees: 12,000

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Burgess, Ronald
Previous Director

A 35-year veteran specializing in military intelligence, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. has served as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency since March 2009. He also serves as commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR). Burgess was Director of Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time that U.S. troops were abusing and torturing prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and in Iraq.

A native of Alabama, Burgess was commissioned in military intelligence through the Auburn University ROTC Program in 1974. He earned a Master of Science degree in education from the University of Southern California in 1980, and a Master of Military Arts and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1986.
His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Officers Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, the Advanced Military Studies Program, and the Air War College.
Burgess has held a variety of key staff and command positions, beginning with assistant executive officer to the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, Washington, DC (1990).
From April 1991 to May 1993, he was company commander of the 124th Military Intelligence Battalion, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and then commander of the 125th Military Intelligence Battalion, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. From May 1993 to May 1994, he was G-2 for the 25th Infantry Division.
Burgess commanded the 470th Military Intelligence Brigade in Panama from June 1995 to May 1997.
From May 1997 to June 1999, he served as director of intelligence, J-2, Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This was followed by director of intelligence, J-2, U.S. Southern Command from June 1999 to May 2003, and director for intelligence, J-2, The Joint Staff from June 2003 to July 2005.
On May 11, 2004, the normally low-profile Burgess was part of a military panel that appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee to testify about the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. Burgess kept his testimony to a minimum. At one point he commented, “In my short 30 years in the military, I'm not surprised much anymore what one person will do to another person.” He also argued that the release of the Abu Ghraib photographs, which shocked Americans and people around the world, had caused “an up-tick…in some of the threat reportings.”
Burgess assumed duty as the deputy director of national intelligence for customer outcomes in August 2005 before transitioning to director of the intelligence staff in February 2007. He was twice asked to take charge as acting principal deputy director of national intelligence from May 2006 to October 2007, and January to February 2009, until a full-time director could be appointed.
Burgess and his wife Marta, who were married in 1975, have five children: Lee, Regina, Julia, Mary, and John.
Official Biography (Defense Intelligence Agency)
Maples, Michael
Past Director
A native of Bonham, Texas, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples served as the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency beginning in November 2005. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point and holds a master’s degree in organizational behavior from Pacific Lutheran University. His military education includes the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, as well as schooling at the US Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College.
Maples’ military career began in 1971 when he was commissioned a second lieutenant of field artillery. His command assignments have included: commanding general of the US Army Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and chief of field artillery for the US Army; assistant division commander, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany; 41st Field Artillery Brigade, Babenhausen, Germany; 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Desert Shield/Desert Storm; and B Battery, 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, 2nd Infantry Division, Republic of Korea.
Maples served as director of operations, readiness and mobilization, and director of military support in the office of the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans at US Army headquarters. He also served as the deputy chief of staff for operations and intelligence for the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps and for the Kosovo Force, Operation Joint Guardian. Other assignments included assistant chief of staff, G3, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, and deputy chief of staff for operations for US Army Europe, Taszar, Hungary, Operation Joint Endeavor.
Prior to becoming director of DIA, Maples served as the vice director and director of management of the Joint Staff. In this capacity, he was the point man for the Joint Staff on detainee policy and operations, and he coordinated the testimony of Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, before the Sept. 11 commission.
In taking over DIA, Maples became the first non-career intelligence officer to lead the spy agency in decades. The decision did not sit well with some former DIA directors. Vice Adm. Thomas R. Wilson, who led the agency from 1999 to 2002, told the New York Times that he was “disappointed” in Maples’ selection. “Just because you put an operator in there doesn't mean he can solve all the problems associated with intelligence support to operators,” Wilson said. “It’s a very complicated business.”
Bush Selects General to Run Spy Agency (by Eric Schmitt, New York Times)